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This paper investigates industry-level effects of government purchases in order to shed light on the
transmission mechanism for government spending on the aggregate economy. We begin by highlighting
the different theoretical predictions concerning the effects of government spending on industry labor
market equilibrium. We then create a panel data set that matches output and labor variables to shifts
in industry-specific government demand. The empirical results indicate that increases in government
demand raise output and hours, but lower real product wages and productivity. Markups do not change
as a result of government demand increases. The results are consistent with the neoclassical model
of government spending, but they are not consistent with the New Keynesian model of the effects
of government spending.
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The recent debate over the government stimulus package has highlighted the lack of
consensus concerning the effects of government spending. While most approaches
agree that increases in government spending lead to rises in output and hours, they
differ in their predictions concerning other key variables. For example, a key differ-
ence between the neoclassical approach and the New Keynesian approach to the ef-
fects of government spending is the behavior of real wages. The neoclassical approach
predicts that an increase in government spending raises labor supply through a neg-
ative wealth effect.1 Under the neoclassical assumption of perfect competition and
diminishing returns to labor, the rise in hours should be accompanied by a short-run
fall in real wages and productivity. In contrast, the standard New Keynesian approach
assumes imperfect competition and either sticky prices or price wars during booms.
This model predicts that a rise in government spending lowers the markup of price
over marginal cost. Thus, an increase in government spending can lead to a rise in
both real wages and hours, despite a decline in productivity.2 In alternate versions
of this approach, increasing returns can allow an increase in government spending to
raise real wage, hours, and productivity.3
In this paper, we seek to shed light on the transmission mechanism by studying
the effects of industry-speciﬁc government spending on hours, real wages and produc-
tivity on a panel of industries. As Ramey and Shapiro (1998) point out, an increase
in government spending is typically focused on only a few industries. Thus, there is
substantial heterogeneity in the experiences of different industries after an increase
or decrease in government spending. This heterogeneity allows us to study the partial
equilibrium effects of government spending in isolation since our panel data structure
permits the use of time ﬁxed effects to net out the aggregate effects. Since the par-
tial equilibrium effects are components of the overall transmission mechanism, it is
instructive to study these in isolation.
Building on the ideas of Shea (1993), Perotti (2008), and Ouyang (2009), we
use information from input-output (IO) data to create industry-speciﬁc government
1. See, for example, Baxter and King (1993).
2. See, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
3. See, for example, Devereux et al. (1996).
1demand variables. We then merge these variables with the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) Manufacturing Industry Database (MID) to create a panel
data set containing information on government demand, hours, output, and wages by
industry.
The empirical results indicate that increases in government demand raise output
and hours signiﬁcantly. On the other hand, real product wages and labor productivity
fall slightly. Markups are unchanged. We show that real product wages and labor
productivity do not fall much because other inputs also rise. All of the results are con-
sistent with the neoclassical model. They are not consistent with the key mechanism
of the New Keynesian model.
2 Relationship to the Literature
The existing empirical evidence on the effects of government spending on real wages
is mixed. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) were perhaps the ﬁrst to conduct a de-
tailed study of the effects of government spending on hours and real wages. Using a
vector autoregression (VAR) to identify shocks, they found that increases in military
purchases led to rises in private hours worked and rises in real wages. Ramey and
Shapiro (1998), however, questioned the ﬁnding on real wages in two ways. First,
analyzing a two-sector theoretical model with costly capital mobility and overtime
premia, they showed that an increase in government spending in one sector could
easily lead to a rise in the aggregate consumption wage but a fall in the product
wage in the expanding sector. Rotemberg and Woodford’s (1992) measure of the
real wage was the manufacturing nominal wage divided by the deﬂator for private
value added, which was a consumption wage. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) showed
that the real product wage in manufacturing, deﬁned as the nominal wage divided by
the producer price index in manufacturing, in fact fell after rises in military spending.
Second, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) argued that the standard types of VARs employed
by Rotemberg and Woodford might not properly identify unanticipated shocks to gov-
ernment spending. With their alternative measure, they found that all measures of
product wages fell after a rise in military spending, whereas consumption wages were
essentially unchanged. Subsequent research that has used standard VAR techniques
2to identify the effects of shocks on aggregate real consumption wages tend to ﬁnd
increases in real wages.4 Research that has used the Ramey-Shapiro methodology has
tended to ﬁnd decreases in real wages.5
Barth and Ramey (2002) and Perotti (2008) are two of the few papers that have
studied the effect of government spending on real wages in industry data. Barth
and Ramey (2002) used monthly data to show that the rise and fall in government
spending on aerospace goods during the 1980s Carter-Reagan defense buildup led to
a concurrent rise and fall in hours, but to the opposite pattern in the real product
wage in that industry. That is, as hours increased, real product wages decreased, and
vice versa. Perotti (2008) used IO tables to identify the industries that received most
of the increase in government spending during the Vietnam War and during the ﬁrst
part of the Carter-Reagan buildup from 1977–82. Based on a heuristic comparison of
the change in real wages among his ranking of industries, Perotti concluded that real
wages increased when hours increased. In the companion discussion, Ramey (2008)
questioned several aspects of the implementation, including Perotti’s assumption that
there had been no changes in capital stock and technology during each ﬁve year
period. A second concern was the fact that the semiconductor and computer industries
were inﬂuential observations that were driving the key results.
On the other hand, most research tends to ﬁnd an increase in labor productivity
at the aggregate level, although it is not often highlighted. For example, even though
their different identiﬁcation methods lead to fundamentally different results for con-
sumption and real wages, the impulse response functions of both Galí et al. (2007)
and Ramey (2009b) imply that aggregate labor productivity rises after an increase in
government spending.
In sum, the evidence for real wages is quite mixed, while the evidence for produc-
tivity is less mixed but often ignored. Therefore, it is useful to study the behavior of
real wages and other labor variables in more detail.
4. See, for example, Fatás and Mihov (2001), Perotti (2004), Pappa (2005), and Galí et al.
(2007).
5. See, for example, Burnside et al. (2004), Cavallo (2005), and Ramey (2009b).
33 Industry Labor Market Equilibrium
In this section, we consider how government spending can affect equilibrium employ-
ment and wages in an industry under various model assumptions. We then use the
theory to derive reduced-form predictions of the various models for the variables of
interest.
To begin, consider the ﬁrst-order condition describing the demand for labor in








The left hand side is the marginal product of labor, with A as technology, H as hours,
and X as a vector of other inputs, including capital. For a neoclassical production
function, we require FH > 0 and FHH < 0. The right hand side is the markup, Mu,
times the real product wage.
The supply of labor to the industry depends on aggregate effects, and potentially
on industry-level variables as well. The aggregate Frisch labor supply depends posi-
tively on the real consumption wage and the marginal utility of wealth, as in Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1991). Thus, we can write the Frisch labor supply of labor as









In this equation, Wi is the wage in industry i, PC is the consumption goods price de-
ﬂator, and  is the marginal utility of wealth. Labor supply depends positively on
both arguments. The ﬁrst argument is just the consumption wage, which we have
written as the product wage in industry i times the relative price of industry i. Poten-
tially, we could include a third term as well, consisting of the industry relative wage.
For example, if the expanding industry must pay an overtime premium, as in one of
the models analyzed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) or if there are adjustment costs
of labor across industries, as in Kline (2008), then it is possible that the wage in an
expanding industry rises relative to wages in other industries.
Figure 1 combines these supply and demand equations to show equilibrium in the
industry’s labor market. Panel (a) considers the labor market effects of an increase in
4government spending in the neoclassical model. The increase in government spending
raises the marginal utility of wealth, which shifts the aggregate labor supply curve
out. If the industry receives more of the government demand, then the industry price
should rise relative to other prices. Thus, Pi=PC should rise, which also shifts out labor
supply to this industry. As a result, equilibrium hours rise and the real product wage
and productivity fall.
In contrast, an industry that does not receive any increase in government spending
may experience a decline in Pi=PC that is large enough to counteract the rise in . In
this case, labor supply curve shifts in. Thus, this industry would experience a decline
in hours, an increase in the real product wage and an increase in productivity.
Panel (b) considers the effects of countercyclical markups in the New Keynesian
model for an industry receiving part of the increase in government spending. Because
the negative wealth effect is still operative in the standard New Keynesian model, the
supply curve shifts out, but now the demand curve also shifts out because the markup
has fallen. The graph makes clear that the expansionary effect on equilibrium hours is
even greater, but the effect on the real wage is ambiguous. Nevertheless, productivity
still falls.
Panel (c) considers the increasing returns model of Devereux et al. (1996). In their
model, ﬁrm-level labor demand curves slope down, but if returns to specialization are
sufﬁciently high, industry-level demand curves can slope upward. In this case, the
shift out of labor supply to the industry can lead to a rise in hours, real wages, and
productivity.
To summarize, the neoclassical model predicts that an increase in government
spending raises an industry’s hours, but lowers its real wage and labor productivity.
The standard New Keynesian model predicts an increase in hours, a decline in produc-
tivity, and an ambiguous effect on real wages. The increasing returns model predicts
a rise in hours, real wages and productivity.
4 Data and Variable Construction
This section describes our data sources and explains how we construct the variables.
Throughout the paper, uppercase letters represent real quantities and a tilde indicates
5a nominal quantity. Lowercase letters indicate the natural logarithm of a variable.
The subscript i denotes industry and t denotes year. When possible, these subscripts
are omitted in the text; however, they remain in all equations.
4.1 Industry-Speciﬁc Government Spending
Our sources for constructing industry-speciﬁc government spending are the bench-
mark IO accounts, which are available roughly quinquennially, in 1947, 1958, 1963,
1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002. The IO accounts for 1947 and
1958 do not contain the industry detail required, so we drop these observations. The
last two IO accounts, 1997 and 2002, are based on the North American industrical
classiﬁcation system (NAICS) rather than the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC).
Because merging the NAICS with the SIC industries is difﬁcult and fraught with po-
tential error, we also drop 1997 and 2002. Thus, we use information from the 1963,
1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992 IO accounts.
Figure 2 shows real federal spending and real defense spending from 1958 to
1997. The vertical lines indicate the years for which the IO accounts are available. The
ﬁgure makes clear that almost all ﬂuctuations in federal government purchases are
due to defense spending. Defense spending started increasing in 1965 after Johnson
sent bombing raids over North Vietnam in February 1965. Defense spending peaked
in 1968 at the height of the Vietnam War, and then fell until the mid-1970s. It began
to rise in 1979, and then accelerated starting in 1980 after the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan in December 1979. Spending peaked in 1987, fell gradually until 1990,
and then fell more steeply.
We use the IO accounts to compute the sum of direct and indirect government
spending. This comprehensive measure captures downstream effects of an industry’s
spending. For example, an increase in government purchases of ﬁnished airplanes
likely also increases shipments of aircraft parts industries that supply parts to the air-
craft industries. Because it is difﬁcult to distinguish nondefense from defense spend-
ing when calculating indirect effects, we use total federal government spending. As
the previous ﬁgure shows, using all federal spending rather than just defense should
not be problematic because most of the level and variation in federal government
purchases is defense spending. Moreover, some spending not classiﬁed as defense,
6such as that for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, is often driven
by defense considerations.
To compute federal government demand, we use the “Transactions” and “Total
Requirements” tables available from the IO accounts. Let ˜ SIO
ijt be the nominal value of
inputs produced by industry i shipped to industry j in year t, measured in producers’
prices. Nominal direct government demand, ˜ Gd, for industry i in year t is the value
of inputs from industry i shipped to the federal government (j = g):
(3) ˜ Gd
it = ˜ SIO
igt.
Indirect government demand, ˜ Gn, is calculated using commodity-by-commodity
unit input requirement coefﬁcients. Let rijt be the commodity i output required per
dollar of each commodity j delivered to ﬁnal demand in year t. The indirect govern-
ment demand for industry i’s output is the direct government purchases from industry







Total government demand for industry i in year t is the sum of direct and indirect
demand:
(5) ˜ Git = ˜ Gd
it + ˜ Gn
it.
Perotti (2008) deﬁned his government demand variable as the change in an in-
dustry’s shipments to the government between two benchmark years divided by total
initial shipments of the industry, i.e., [Git   Gi(t 5)]=Si(t 5). His measure is poten-
tially problematic, though, because it makes the questionable assumption that the
distribution of government spending across industries is uncorrelated with industry
technological change. As we will argue below, we have reason to believe that his
measure is correlated with industry-speciﬁc technological change.
We therefore construct an alternative measure of a government demand shock
that should not be correlated with industry-speciﬁc technology. In particular, we de-
7ﬁne the growth in government demand for industry i, git, as
(6) git = i gt,
where i is the average share of an industry’s total nominal shipments that go to
the government and gt is log of aggregate real federal spending (based on national
income and product accounts (NIPA) data). We calculate the share of industry i’s total







We then calculate industry i’s average dependence on the government, i, by aver-
aging over all IO years (1963–92). Table 1 shows the 15 industries with the largest
share of shipments to the government. Not surprisingly, most are defense industries.
Thus, our new measure converts the aggregate government demand variable into
an industry speciﬁc variable using the industry’s long-term dependence on the govern-
ment as a weight. The idea behind this measure is that a given increase in aggregate
government spending should have a bigger impact on an industry that, on average,
sends a higher fraction of its output to the government. We could, in principle, use a
time-varying weight using the individual IO tables. We decided against this approach
because of concern that changes in technology could drive changes in industry shares
over time. On the other hand, if there is a correlation between industry long-run
average technology growth and the long-run average industry government shipment
share, it will be accounted for in the empirical analysis by industry ﬁxed effects.
4.2 Variables from the Manufacturing Industry Database
The Manufacturing Industry Database (MID), maintained by the NBER and Center for
Economic Studies (CES), contains annual data for 458 4-digit SIC code manufacturing
industries from 1958 to 1996.6 Most of the information is derived from the Annual
Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). We use the version based on the 1987 SIC codes.7
6. Bartelsman et al. (2000).
7. Throughout the paper, all SIC codes reported are the 1987 version.
8The database provides information on hours only for production workers. We
created two measures of total hours using two extreme assumptions: nonproduction
workers always work 1,960 hours per year and nonproduction workers always work
as much as production workers. This ﬁgure is slightly less than the usual 2000 hours
per year because it allows for vacations and holidays, which are not included in pro-
duction worker hours measures. The results were very similar, so we only report the
results using the assumption that nonproduction workers always work 1,960 hours
per year. The production worker product wage is the production worker wage bill
divided by production worker hours times the shipments deﬂator.
For one set of results, we construct share-weighted growth of inputs. The payroll
data from the MID include only wages and salaries, and do not include payments for
beneﬁts, such as Social Security and health insurance. Thus, labor share estimates
from this database are biased downward. Fortunately, Chang and Hong (2006) have
compiled annual information for each 2-digit manufacturing industry from the NIPA
of the ratio of total compensation to wages and salaries. We merge these factors to
our 4-digit data and use them to magnify the payroll data to create more accurate
labor shares.
We construct real shipments by dividing nominal shipments by the shipments price
deﬂator. However, because ﬁrms hold inventories, shipments are not necessarily equal
to output. According to the standard inventory identity, real gross output, Y, is equal
to real shipments, S, plus the change in real ﬁnished-goods and work-in-process in-
ventories, IF. The MID database reports only the total value of inventories, I, at the
end of the year; it does not distinguish inventories by stage of process in the reported
stocks.
Fortunately, we can back out the nominal change in materials inventories from
other data in the MID. In particular, the measure of nominal value added, ˜ V, in the
MID is deﬁned as:
(8) ˜ VMID
it = ˜ Sit   ˜ Mit +˜ IF
it,
where ˜ M is nominal materials cost.
Since total inventories is the sum of ﬁnished-goods and work-in-process invento-
ries and materials inventories, IM, the change in materials inventories can be inferred
9from the change in total inventories and the change in ﬁnished-goods and work-in-
process inventories: ˜ IM
it = ˜ Iit   ˜ IF
it. Using this inventory relationship, we calcu-

















where P is the price of output. This formulation for gross output is not exact because









Unfortunately the MID does not have data on the stock of materials inventories at each










which is the product of the real initial stock of materials inventories (valued at output
prices) and the rate of inﬂation of output prices. According to Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) estimates of inventories and sales in manufacturing, the real stock
of materials inventories is about 50 percent of monthly sales, or about 4 percent of
annual sales. Even if annual inﬂation is as high as 10 percent, the bias would only be
 0.4 percent.
Many studies have used value added measures of output. However, Norrbin
(1993) discusses the biases associated with using value added rather than gross out-
put, and Basu and Fernald (1997) argue that value added is only valid with perfect
competition and constant markups of unity. Thus, we do not use value added as a
measure of output.
We also use MID measures of total capital, plant, equipment, investment, mate-
rials usage and energy usage. The MID also includes price indexes for capital, in-
vestment, materials, and energy. We create real series from the nominal values by
dividing by the appropriate price index.
10We merge the MID data with the IO data by developing a correspondence be-
tween the 6-digit IO code–based IO data and the 4-digit SIC code–based MID data.8
The merged database contains 272 industries at the 4-digit SIC level. Because some of
the industries were combined in the merge, we had to aggregate some variables from
the MID. The real quantities were deﬁned at the industry level as the nominal quanti-
ties divided by the relevant price index. Because the price indices in this data base are
ﬁxed-weight indices, it is possible to sum the real quantities. We then summed nomi-
nal and real quantities for the combined industries and used their ratios to construct
price indices.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Properties of Industry-Speciﬁc Government Demand
The usefulness of our government demand variable for distinguishing between the
various theories depends on two key features. First, in order for it to represent only
shifts in industry demand, it must be uncorrelated with technology. Second, it should
be relevant, in the sense that it is sufﬁciently correlated with industry output or hours.
In this section, we assess how well the government demand variable satisﬁes these
two properties.
At the aggregate level, there is substantial evidence that ﬂuctuations in military
spending are mostly driven by geopolitical events and are for the most part exoge-
nous to the current state of the economy.9 Since most variations in federal purchases
are due to military spending, it is unlikely that aggregate shipments to the govern-
ment are correlated with technology. That said, it is possible that the distribution of
military spending across industries could be related to technological change. To see
why technology might inﬂuence government spending at the industry level, consider
the following example. Between 1972 and 1977, real federal spending declined by 3
percent and real defense spending fell by 9 percent. In contrast, total real federal pur-
chases of computers (SIC 3571) rose by 219 percent over this period. This increase
8. The correspondence tables are available on the authors’ web sites.
9. For example, Ramey (2009a).
11was 20 percent of the initial value of shipments in 1972, yet the fraction of shipments
that went to the government rose only slightly, from 7 percent in 1972 to 9 percent in
1977 because industry shipments to nongovernment destinations also rose dramati-
cally. Clearly, the increase in government spending on computers during this period
was not due to a “demand shift,” but rather because technological change in the com-
puter industry shifted government demand toward that industry and away from other
industries. In other words, it is likely that the rise in industry-speciﬁc government
spending was correlated with industry-speciﬁc technology growth.
It is for this reason that we do not adopt Perotti’s (2008) deﬁnition of shifts in
government demand. Perotti (2008) compared the change in shipments to the gov-
ernment over a ﬁve-year period to the initial total shipments of the industry. By his
deﬁnition, the increase in computer shipments to the government would be classiﬁed
as a very large demand shock, whereas it is clear that it was linked to industry-speciﬁc
technological change.
The second desirable feature for our demand shifter is relevance. Is our govern-
ment demand variable sufﬁciently correlated with output and hours? To investigate
this feature, table 2 reports reduced-form regressions of the log change of two output
measures and three labor measures on the government demand variable. The ﬁrst row
reports the results of a simple regression of the growth in real gross shipments on the
growth of our government demand variable (g). The coefﬁcient is 1.84 (standard
error of 0.16), implying that a 1-percent increase in aggregate federal spending causes
shipments to rise by almost 1 percent in an industry that on average ships 50 percent
of its output to the government. The coefﬁcient is estimated very precisely. Although
the R2 is very low, the F statistic on the coefﬁcient is 128, implying that our govern-
ment demand variable is very relevant. The second row estimates this speciﬁcation
including year and industry ﬁxed effects. The estimate is higher, at 2.46 (0.17), and
is highly signiﬁcant. The third row of table 2 shows the ﬁxed-effects regression of the
growth in real gross output (which includes changes in work-in-process and ﬁnished
goods inventories) on the growth of government demand. The estimated coefﬁcient
is 2.38 (0.18), statistically identical to that from the regression with shipments (line
2). In every case our government spending variable is highly relevant.
Rows 4–6 of table 2 report the estimated effects of changes in government de-
12mand on production worker hours and employment. All regressions include year and
industry ﬁxed effects. Row 4 shows the impact on production worker hours. The
coefﬁcient is 2.61 (0.16), which is somewhat above the coefﬁcient for output. The
government demand variable is also relevant for this variable, as evidenced by the
implied F statistic. Rows 5 and 6 show that virtually all of the change is due to
changes in employment rather than average hours per worker.
To summarize the results of this section, the evidence shows that the new gov-
ernment demand variable we constructed is a very relevant instrument for shifts in
output and hours. We have presented evidence that Perotti’s (2008) measure may
be correlated with industry-speciﬁc technology. In contrast, we have constructed our
demand measure so that it is not subject to this problem.
5.2 Government Demand Effects on Prices and Productivity
5.2.1 Wages and Prices
Table 3 shows the results of instrumental variables (IV) regressions of wages and
prices on total production worker hours. To isolate the effect of a government-demand
induced rise in hours on wages and prices, we instrument for hours using our govern-
ment demand variable. In particular, we regress the log change in product wages on
the log change in hours, which is instrumented by the government demand variable.
Row 1 shows that a government demand–induced increase in hours leads to a small
decline in the relative real product wage. The estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 7 percent level, but is economically small. Row 2 shows that an industry’s relative
wage does not change signiﬁcantly, whereas row 3 shows that the relative price of
an industry’s rises.10 Thus, the decline in the real product wage is mostly due to a
rise in the relative product price. These results are qualitatively consistent with the
competitive model shown in section 3.
These results stand in contrast to Perotti’s (2008) conclusion that government
spending raises real wages. Perotti used similar data sources, but based his analy-
sis on ranking the top industries receiving government spending from 1963 to 1967
10. These results pertain to relative wages and prices because we have included time ﬁxed
effects.
13and from 1977 through 1982. Based on visual inspection of his table, he concluded
that “the sectors that experience the largest government spending shocks are also the
sectors that experienced the largest positive changes in the real product wage.” 11
To determine the source of the differences in our conclusions, we construct Per-
otti’s (2008) government demand instrument, which is available only as ﬁve-year
differences due to the frequency of the IO tables. We then regress the ﬁve-year log
change in the real product wage on the ﬁve-year log change in hours, instrumented by
this government demand variable. The coefﬁcient is 0.15 (0.07), indicating a signiﬁ-
cant increase in real wages. However, when we include time and industry ﬁxed effects
in the regression, we obtain a coefﬁcient of  0.0005 (0.06). Thus, Perotti’s (2008)
ﬁnding of a positive effect of government spending on real wages is due both to his
deﬁnition of the government spending shock (with its potential correlation with tech-
nology) and his failure to account for industry and time ﬁxed effects. When we use
our annual government spending shock and include industry and time ﬁxed effects,
we ﬁnd a small negative effect on real product wages.
5.2.2 Labor Productivity
We next investigate the effects of a government demand–induced rise in hours on
labor productivity. To understand the interpretation of the coefﬁcient, consider the
special case of a Cobb-Douglas production function where the exponent on labor is .





it + xit +ait,
where y is the log of real output, hp is the log of production-worker hours, x is the
share-weighted log of other inputs, and a is the log of technology. If there is no change
in other inputs, then our government demand instrument is valid for estimating  1
since the instrument is uncorrelated with technology a. On the other hand, if other
inputs are also increasing, then the demand instrument will be positively correlated
with the error term and the estimate of  1 will be biased upward.
Rows 4 and 5 of table 3 shows the effect of a government demand–induced rise
11. Perotti (2008), p. 208.
14in hours on two measures of the growth in labor productivity. In each case, we divide
an output measure by total hours of production workers. Both equations include
year and industry ﬁxed effects. The ﬁrst measure uses real gross shipments and the
second uses real gross output (equation 9). In both cases, the coefﬁcient is small but
negative, implying that a rise in hours leads to a slight decline in labor productivity.
If we believe that other inputs are ﬁxed, then the coefﬁcient implies a high value of 
of 0.91 or 0.94. As we will show below, however, other inputs do rise in response to
government spending shock. Thus, this estimate is likely an upper bound on .
5.2.3 Markup
We can combine the results for productivity and real wages to determine the impli-
cations for the countercyclical markup hypothesis that is key to the New Keynesian
explanation of ﬁscal policy. To see this, consider the deﬁnition of the log change in
the markup:











where w is the log of the nominal wage and p is the log of the output price.
Rows 6 and 7 of table 3 show IV regressions of the change in the markup on
the change in total production worker hours. We calculate the markup with two
output measures, one using real shipments and the other using real gross output.
Both measures of the markup are essentially constant in response to an increase in
hours. In one case, the coefﬁcient estimate is 0.02 (0.05) and in the other it is  0.01
(0.04), but in neither case is it statistically different from zero. Thus, markups appear
to be constant in response to a shift in government demand.
5.3 Effects of Government Demand on Other Inputs
We now investigate the effects of government spending on several other key inputs.
We begin by studying the responses of particular inputs. We then construct a share-
weighted measure of inputs and estimate the implied returns to scale.
155.3.1 Other Inputs
Table 4 reports the reduced-form response of various inputs to industry-speciﬁc gov-
ernment spending changes. The ﬁrst row reproduces the response of production
worker hours for comparison. Supervisory worker employment increases signiﬁcantly
(row 2), but the response, 2.33 (0.19), is smaller than for production workers hours
(row 1), 2.61 (0.16). Thus, the ratio of supervisory workers to production workers
declines when government demand increases.
Rows 3–5 investigate the response of various measures of capital inputs. Row
3 shows the response of the real capital stock. The response is positive and signif-
icant, but with a coefﬁcient of 0.50 (0.06) it is much smaller than for labor. Thus,
the increase in government spending leads to a decline in the capital-labor ratio. It
is possible, however, that capital services could rise by more than the capital stock if
capital utilization increases in response to government spending. To investigate this
possibility, we consider two measures of capital utilization that have been used in the
literature. The ﬁrst measure is energy usage. Numerous papers have used electricity
consumption as an indirect measure of capital utilization.12 We do not have informa-
tion in our data set on electricity consumption, but we do have information on overall
energy usage. Thus, the fourth row of table 4 reports the response of real energy
usage. The coefﬁcient estimate is 0.42 (0.21). If utilization is proportional to energy
usage, then we can combine this estimate with the growth of capital of 0.50, to infer
that capital services rise by 0.92. While larger than the basic estimate, it is still far be-
low the rise in production worker hours. The second indicator of capital utilization we
consider is Shapiro’s (1993) measure of the workweek of capital, which is based on
the Census Bureau’s Survey of Plant Capacity. This measure counts hours per day and
days per week that a plant operates. Shapiro (1993) used this measure to show that
the Solow residual is no longer procyclical once this utilization measure is included.
Unfortunately, Shapiro’s (1993) measure is only available from 1977 to 1987 and only
for a subset of the industries. Row 5 reports the effects of government spending on
this measure. The coefﬁcient is  0.61 (0.79) and is not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus,
this alternative source does not raise the estimate of the growth of capital services.
Row 6 shows the response of real materials inputs excluding energy. In this case,
12. See, for example, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and Burnside et al. (1996).
16the response is 2.70 (0.20), slightly larger than for hours or output. Row 7 shows the
results for the ratio of real materials to output. The coefﬁcient is 0.32 (0.13) and is
statistically signiﬁcant from zero.
5.3.2 Implications for Returns to Scale
To study the response of other inputs more systematically, we can estimate the overall
returns to scale using the framework pioneered by Hall (1990), and extended by Basu
and Fernald (1997). In particular, we can estimate overall returns to scale from the
following equation:
(13) yit = zit +ait,
where z is the share-weighted growth of all inputs. The coefﬁcient  measures the
returns to scale. If technology is the only source of error in this equation, then one
can estimate  by using a demand instrument that is correlated with input growth but
uncorrelated with technology.
Consider a measure of share-weighted input growth treating energy as an input
to production:
(14) zit = skkit +shhit +smmit +seeit,
where k is the log of the real capital stock, h is the log of total hours, m is the log of
real materials usage, e is the log of real energy usage, and sj is the share of input j.
As discussed in section 4.2, we construct the labor share (sh) using Chang and Hong’s
(2006) factors to inﬂate the observed labor share to account for fringe beneﬁts. This
raises the average labor share in the data set by 3 percentage points. Following Basu
et al. (2006), we calculate the capital share as the residual from labor share and
materials share and by using shares averaged over the entire sample.
We estimate the return to scale using an IV regression of the growth of log gross
output on the share-weighted growth of inputs and on year and industry ﬁxed effects.
We instrument for z with our government demand variable (g). The ﬁrst-stage
regression of the share-weighted inputs on our government variable has an F statistic
that exceeds 200, indicating high relevance. The ﬁrst row of table 5 reports the
17IV regression. The estimated coefﬁcient is 1.11 (0.05), indicating small, marginally
statistically-signiﬁcant increasing returns to scale.
However, as numerous papers have made clear, unobserved variations in capital
utilization or labor effort may contaminate the error term.13 Because these variations
are likely to be correlated with any instrument that is also correlated with observed
input growth, estimates of  are likely to be biased upward. We attempt to mitigate
this bias in two ways. The ﬁrst is to include a proxy for unobserved utilization. The
second is to construct z treating energy usage as a proxy for capital utilization.
Basu et al. (2006) use the theory of the ﬁrm to show that, under certain condi-
tions, unobserved variations in capital utilization and labor effort are proportional to
the growth in average hours per worker. Row 2 of table 5 adds the growth of aver-
age hours per worker (¯ h) to control for unobserved utilization. The estimate of the
return to scale is little changed. Nevertheless, this speciﬁcation is probably invalid
because ¯ h is uncorrelated with technology only under restrictive assumptions.
Although g is highly relevant for z, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd additional relevant in-
struments for ¯ h. We attempt to create extra instruments by using separate measures
of direct and indirect government shipments and a quadratic in total government
shipments as instruments for both variables. All statistics (such as Shea’s partial R2)
suggest the instruments have low relevance for ¯ h after being used for z.14 Row
3 of table 5 reports the results of this IV regression. The estimate of the return to
scale is little changed at 1.09 (0.06) and the coefﬁcient on average hours per worker
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Nonetheless, we are not very conﬁdent of this
speciﬁcation given the weak instruments.
A second approach to mitigate unobserved utilization is to construct z treating
capital utilization as proportional to energy usage. This alternate measure of share-
weighted input growth is






where mxe is the log of real materials usage excluding energy. As before, we instru-
ment for z with g. Row 4 of table 5 reports the regression using this alternate
13. See, for example, Burnside et al. (1996) and Basu (1996).
14. Shea (1997).
18measure of input growth. The estimated coefﬁcient, 1.07 (0.05), is not statistically
different from unity, implying constant returns to scale.
In sum, our results are completely consistent with the neoclassical assumptions
concerning the effects of government spending. An increase in output induced by
government spending raises hours, but lowers real wages and productivity. Taking all
inputs into account, we cannot reject constant returns to scale.
6 Conclusion
Our study of the effects of industry-speciﬁc changes in government spending indicates
that an increase in government demand raises an industry’s relative output and hours.
These increases are associated with small declines in its relative real wage and labor
productivity, and a rise in its relative price. Its use of other inputs, such as capital,
energy, and materials, rises as well. Our estimates of returns to scale are consistent
with constant returns to scale. Thus, the results support the microeconomic assump-
tions underlying the neoclassical theory of the effects of government spending. In
contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence of the rising real wages or countercyclical markups that
are central to the standard New Keynesian explanation for the effects of government
spending.
A key question, then, is why aggregate evidence indicates that an increase in
government spending raises labor productivity whereas the industry-level evidence
presented in this paper indicates that an increase in demand associated with higher
government spending lowers labor productivity slightly. Basu and Fernald (1997) pro-
vide an answer based on their extensive study of the effects of aggregation on returns
to scale estimates. They show that durable goods manufacturers have higher returns
to scale than many other industries, some of which exhibit sharply diminishing returns
to scale. Thus, anything that shifts output toward durable goods producers will lead
to aggregate behavior that looks like increasing returns to scale. The 15 industries
that depend most on government spending are all durable goods manufacturing in-
dustries. Thus, the increase in aggregate labor productivity in response to government
spending can be explained by reallocation rather than by ﬁrm-level or industry-level
increasing returns.
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22Table 1. Industries with Largest Share of Shipments to the Government
Rank SIC Industry i
1 3761 Guided missiles and space vehicles 0.920
2 3483 Ammunition, except for small arms, n.e.c. 0.807
3 3489 Ordnance and accessories, n.e.c. 0.769
4 3728 Aircraft and missile equipment, n.e.c. 0.628
5 3731 Ship building and repairing 0.626
6 3724 Aircraft and missile engines and engine parts 0.610
7 3663 Communication equipment 0.496
8 3721 Aircraft 0.491
9 3795 Sighting and ﬁre control equip. 0.489
10 3812 Engineering and scientiﬁc instruments 0.435
11 3463 Nonferrous forgings 0.419
12 3482 Small arms ammunition 0.384
13 3339 Primary nonferrous metals, n.e.c. 0.321
14 3672 Other electronic components 0.294
15 3674 Semiconductors and related devices 0.282
Source: Author’s calculations using data from BEA benchmark IO tables.
Notes: i is the average share of industry i’s total nominal shipments that go to the federal
government. Calculated from a panel of 274 industries in 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982,
1987, and 1992.




Dependent variable git effects R2
Output measures
1. Real shipments 1.836 No 0.013
(0.162)
2. Real shipments 2.464 Yes 0.020
(0.172)
3. Real gross output 2.376 Yes 0.017
(0.182)
Production worker measures
4. Total hours 2.610 Yes 0.027
(0.155)
5. Employment 2.572 Yes 0.029
(0.149)
6. Average hours 0.038 Yes 0.000
(0.056)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the NBER-CES MID and BEA IO tables.
Notes: Dependent variable is annual change in the log of the output or labor variable listed.
All labor variables refer to production workers. git is the industry-speciﬁc change in govern-
ment demand (see equation 6). All regressions have 10,135 observations from a panel of 274
industries over 1960–96; regressions include year and industry ﬁxed effects when indicated.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1-percent, ** at
5-percent, and * at 10-percent level.
24Table 3. Instrumental-Variables Regressions of Wages, Prices, Labor Pro-







1. Real wage  0.076 0.170
(0.042)
2. Nominal wage  0.015 0.299
(0.026)
3. Price of output 0.061 0.335
(0.034)
Productivity
4. Measured with real shipments  0.056 0.120
(0.047)
5. Measured with real gross output  0.090 0.119
(0.049)
Markup
6. Measured with real shipments 0.020 0.055
(0.045)
7. Measured with real gross output  0.014 0.064
(0.044)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the NBER-CES MID and BEA IO tables.
Notes: Dependent variable is annual change of the log of the variable listed. Independent
variable is the annual change of the log of total production worker hours (h
p
it), instrumented
by the industry-speciﬁc change in government demand (git, see equation 6). All regressions
have 10,133 observations from a panel of 274 industries over 1960–96 and include year and
industry ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance
at 1-percent, ** at 5-percent, and * at 10-percent level.




Dependent variable git R2
1. Production worker total hours 2.610 0.027
(0.155)
2. Supervisory worker employment 2.327 0.014
(0.194)
3. Real capital stock 0.497 0.007
(0.060)
4. Real energy 0.419 0.001
(0.205)
5. Workweek of capital  0.611 0.000
(0.789)
6. Real materials excluding energy 2.700 0.017
(0.204)
7. Real materials-output ratio 0.324 0.001
(0.128)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the NBER-CES MID and BEA IO tables.
Notes: Dependent variable is annual change in the log of the output or labor variable listed.
All labor variables refer to production workers. git is the industry-speciﬁc change in gov-
ernment demand (see equation 6). Regressions have 10,135 observations from a panel of 274
industries over 1960–96; regression with workweek of capital (row 5) has only 1,793 obser-
vations. All regressions include year and industry ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1-percent, ** at 5-percent, and * at 10-percent
level.
26Table 5. Instrumental-Variables Regressions of Output Growth on Input
Growth
Independent variable
Input growth deﬁnition zit ¯ hit R2
1. Energy as input 1.108 0.743
(0.049)
2. ¯ h as proxy for utilization, not 1.109  0.013 0.743
instrumented (0.049) (0.025)
3. ¯ h as proxy for utilization, 1.093 0.856 0.688
instrumenteda (0.066) (2.135)
4. Energy as proxy for utilization 1.065 0.692
(0.051)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the NBER-CES MID and BEA IO tables.
Notes: Dependent variable is annual change of log real output. zit is annual growth of
share-weighted log inputs (including production worker hours); see equations 14 and 15.
¯ hit is annual growth of average hours per worker. Except for row 3, zit instrumented
by industry-speciﬁc change in government demand (git, see equation 6). All regressions
have 10,133 observations from a panel of 274 industries over 1960–96 and include year and
industry ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance
at 1-percent, ** at 5-percent, and * at 10-percent level.
a. Both zit and ¯ hit instrumented by direct shipments to government (gd
it), indirect
shipments to government (gn
it), and the square of total shipments to government.

























































































Notes: Vertical lines indicate years where benchmark input-output data are available.
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